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Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the
Central Mediterranean
Paolo Cuttitta
Department of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article analyses the search and rescue (SAR) activities carried
out by three NGOs (MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch) in the Central
Mediterranean, and asks whether and in how far non-
governmental SAR contributes to the repoliticization of the EU
maritime border. The article first introduces the concept of
depoliticization/repoliticization, as well as that of humanitariani-
zation. Two sections summarize the development of the SAR
regime and the governmentalization of international waters in
the Strait of Sicily from the Cap Anamur case to 2016, and from
late 2016 to recent days. Against this backdrop, the article
analyses the different political positions taken by MOAS, MSF
and Sea-Watch, their operational activities, as well as their
cooperation and relations with the other actors involved in
SAR. The three NGOs react differently to the contradictions
that are typical of humanitarian non-state action. MOAS keeps
a neutral political profile, whereas MSF and Sea-Watch regard
their SAR activities as part of a political, not only humanitarian
commitment. While the convergence of delocalized state sover-
eignty and humanitarian reason leaves hardly any room for
manoeuvre, MSF and Sea-Watch try to question and contrast
governmental policies and practices, as well as to turn interna-
tional waters into a political stage from which they can make
their voice heard and on which they can play the watchdog role.
Introduction
Since 2014, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been gradually
changing the search and rescue (SAR) scene in the Central Mediterranean.
Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), a Maltese foundation created by an
Italian–American couple in 2014, was the first to launch a rescue operation,
with its ship Phoenix, at the end of August that year. The mission had to be
stopped after two months because of financial constraints, but in 2015 the
Amsterdam operational centre of the medical-humanitarian
organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) allowed MOAS to resume
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activities by providing the necessary funding and the medical staff. In the
same year, the MSF operational centres of Barcelona and Brussels (the latter
also including Rome), as well as Sea-Watch, a German association created by
private citizens in 2014, each set up their own vessel: the Dignity I, the
Bourbon Argos and the Sea-Watch, respectively.1 In 2015, the three organi-
zations rescued 20,063 of the 152,3432 migrants who were brought to Italy
after being found in the Central Mediterranean. After the winter break, they
all resumed SAR activities in 2016, with some changes regarding both the
partnerships and the vessels: Sea-Watch replaced the old boat with a larger
one (the Sea-Watch 2); MOAS ended its cooperation with MSF and launched
its third SAR season with two ships (the Phoenix and the Responder), in
partnership with the Italian Red Cross; MSF, besides running the Bourbon
Argos and the Dignity I, also provided the medical staff for the ship set up by
another association, SOS Méditerranée. Also other NGOs3 decided to engage
in SAR in the Central Mediterranean that year. Thus, the number of non-
governmental SAR vessels rose from four in 2015 to thirteen in 2016, while
the number of people rescued reached 46,796 (out of a total of 178,415).4
This article focuses on the work carried out by MOAS, MSF and Sea-
Watch, and asks whether and in how far non-governmental SAR can be seen
as an attempt to repoliticize migration and border management at the EU sea
border, against the depoliticizing effects of European migration and border
policies, as well as of humanitarian work.
In analysing the work carried out by MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch, and in
pointing out the differences between the three organizations, the article
highlights the tension between the attempts made by some NGOs to repoli-
ticize migration and border management (by questioning, influencing and
contrasting governmental policies) and the contribution provided by all of
them to its depoliticization (by supporting, through the enhancement of
overall SAR and transport capacities, the institutional system of migration
and border management; by relieving states from their SAR responsibilities,
thus allowing them to focus on border enforcement; by providing a huma-
nitarian legitimation for exclusionary policies and practices).
The article contributes to the growing body of work on humanitarian
borders within critical border studies,5 and, by focusing on NGOs, it com-
plements existing literature on the relationship between transnational migra-
tion management and depoliticization/repoliticization,6 which deals almost
exclusively with international and intergovernmental organizations.7
The research is based on document analysis and fieldwork. Document ana-
lysis included a press review as well as the analysis of the information provided
by MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch8 through their websites, press releases and
newsletters. Fieldwork included both interviews and informal conversations.
Ten semi-structured interviews were conducted with eleven NGO representa-
tives (one from MOAS, two from MSF Amsterdam, two from MSF Rome, one
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fromMSF Brussels, one fromMSF Barcelona, four from Sea-Watch) in different
places (Lampedusa, Sliema, Rome, Amsterdam, Zarzis), as well as on telephone
and Skype, between June 2015 and June 2016. Moreover, a series of interviews
and informal conversations with other border workers, both governmental and
non-governmental, was conducted during fieldwork in Italy, Malta and Tunisia
between June 2015 and April 2016. Further personal, e-mail and telephone
informal conversations with MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch representatives took
place during 2016. Unless otherwise stated, quotations are from interviews or
conversations with the author.
The first section introduces the concept of depoliticization/repoliticization.
The second summarizes the development of the SAR regime and the govern-
mentalization of international waters in the Strait of Sicily from the Cap
Anamur case to 2016. The third section analyses the different political
positions taken by MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch, their operational activities
and their cooperation and relations with other actors, pointing out both the
depoliticizing and the repoliticizing effects of non-governmental SAR, as well
as the differences between the three NGOs. The fourth section analyses the
developments occurring on the Central Mediterranean SAR scene since mid-
2016. The concluding section, after summarizing how SAR NGOs fluctuate
between depoliticization and repoliticization, argues that their most signifi-
cant political task, in the current reconfiguration of the Central
Mediterranean, is opposing the externalization of SAR to Libya.
Depoliticization vs. Repoliticization
Broadly speaking, depoliticization is associated with the marketization9 of
policy-making processes and “the rise of technocratic forms of
governance”,10 but it also refers, more specifically, to the tendency of political
actors to obscure the political character of politics and to present policy-
making as a neutral, necessary and indisputable process, in which the possi-
bility to choose between different political (not merely technical) alternatives,
as well as that for disagreement and contestation, is limited or denied.
While it could well be argued that there is something political in every
human action (even in the supposedly ‘neutral’ fields of science and
technology),11 the meaning of the adjective ‘political’ shouldn’t be seen “as
wide as encompassing all ways of being”:12 first, because if everything is
political the adjective itself becomes meaningless;13 second, because “there is
nothing inherently radical or emancipatory about a conception of politics
that encompasses all human and nonhuman relations”.14
Therefore, “[a]n action is political […] to the extent it opens up the
possibility for disagreement”,15 and repoliticization is the process that
restores the conflictual character that Schmitt identified as the essence of
the political.16 Instead, processes of depoliticization transform politics “from
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vivid clashes […] to […] a dull, technical discussion about means for
promoting goals questioned by none”,17 whereby such discussion is largely
based on the know-how of experts, technocrats and specialized organizations
(also including NGOs). If depoliticizing means obscuring, repoliticizing
means revealing and reviving the political (that is the plural and conflictual)
character of politics.
In the specific field of migration and border management,
the very notion of ‘management’ is characterized by its apolitical and technocratic
nature, and its popularity (to the detriment of other notions such as ‘the politics of
migration’) is in itself a way of depoliticizing migration. Policies would not result
from political choices, but from ‘technical’ considerations and informal decision-
making processes on the most appropriate and successful way of addressing
migration.18
Indeed, the growing tendency in Europe to locate the issue of migration in
technocratic arenas played an important role in structuring the relevant field
in depoliticized, restrictive and security terms,19 and in making such frame
appear inevitable and hardly questionable. However, depoliticization was also
preceded and accompanied by processes of politicization aimed at making
the electoral use of the issue of migration profitable,20 which was clearly the
case, for example, for securitization.21
More generally, the issue of migration is depoliticized not only through
“the technocratic reliance on expertise and empirical evidence to avoid
political controversies” but also through “a naturalisation of the global socio-
economic and political context in which migration takes place, which is taken
for granted and therefore unchallenged”.22 Repoliticizing migration and
border policies means therefore promoting “the existence of antagonism,
conflict, difference and choice”23 as opposed to the passive acceptance of
the whole framework.
Importantly, humanitarianization can be a key factor in both depoliticiza-
tion processes and the naturalization of given contexts. The term ‘humani-
tarianization’ refers to the increasing “deployment of moral sentiments in
contemporary politics”24 and the “tremendous growth of humanitarian
governance”,25 the latter being defined as “the increasingly organized and
internationalized attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, and reduce
the suffering of the world’s most vulnerable populations”.26
In the field of migration and border management, the process of huma-
nitarianization is apparent in at least two respects. The first is the increasing
use of humanitarian arguments made by policy-makers in order to justify
and enhance (restrictive) migration and border policies and practices.27
The second is the growing relevance of humanitarian borderwork.
Importantly, NGOs are playing an ever-increasing role in such process. As
says Fassin, (humanitarian) NGOs thus often become
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political actors engaged in power relations, plays of alliance, and systems of
negotiations with states and international institutions, which, in turn, rely on the
legitimacy of humanitarian reason and those who promote it.28
In Fassin’s statement, however, being ‘political actors’ doesn’t mean for
NGOs to be acting against depoliticization processes. It rather means being
partners of governmental actors in the increasingly hybrid spheres of
politics and governance.29 Whether the action of NGOs is ‘political’ – in
the sense described above – depends on what kind of politics they con-
tribute to produce, on whether their work reproduces or challenges the
existing framework. Academic research shows that NGOs, regardless of the
field in which they are operating, often end up perpetuating existing power
relations.30 Humanitarian NGOs engaged in rescuing lives and providing
medical care in emergency situations are further limited by the fact that
life-threatening emergencies require immediate action, for the preservation
of human life is the absolute priority, which results in the structural
(political) causes of the very same emergencies to be more easily obscured.
Along this line, since SAR is now called a priority of all institutional
actions aimed at enhancing sea border control (from the Eurosur surveil-
lance system to Frontex missions, from the Italian military-humanitarian
mission Mare Nostrum to the EU military operation Eunavfor Med),31 the
Mediterranean appears more and more as a depoliticized space, suggesting
a managerial-technocratic vision of the border: a space “deprived of
human agency”,32 in which events, including border deaths, “can easily
be naturalized and connected to registers of fate”,33 and therefore “system-
atically depoliticized”.34 Then, the only two issues to be discussed, in the
pre-given and unquestioned framework of a restrictive border regime, are
how to reduce the death toll at sea, by improving SAR practices, and how
to better prevent people from trying to cross, by improving the fight
against smugglers, whereby the humanitarianization of migration and
border management converges with its securitization.
Within this framework, SAR NGOs are confronted with the old dilemmas
of humanitarianism: should humanitarian action limit itself to providing
relief or should it also address the causes of suffering?35 Are the traditional
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence compa-
tible with the aim to be “an agent of change”?36 Can humanitarian action be
politically neutral, or is politics inevitably part of it, and the question should
therefore be “not whether to be political, but what kind of politics to
promote”?37
Therefore, this article asks whether SAR NGOs in the Central
Mediterranean are doing not only humanitarian but also political border-
work, and, if so, to what extent they are actually repoliticizing the EU border,
following Bourdieu’s exhortation to restore “political thinking and action”38
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against the policy of depoliticization. Attempting to answer this question
requires analysing the work of SAR NGOs against the background of the
humanitarianized EU sea border regime, to see what dynamics made inde-
pendent SAR possible, and under what conditions.
The Humanitarian Governmentalization of International Waters
Before the period under study, the only precedent of a humanitarian vessel
rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean was that of the Cap Anamur. On
24 June 2004, 100 nautical miles south of Lampedusa, the German humanitar-
ian ship came across a partially deflated dinghy, which was taking in water,
with 37 people aboard. All passengers were taken on board the Cap Anamur.39
The humanitarian ship, however, didn’t immediately look for a safe place
where to bring the migrants, and didn’t contact any state authorities. Instead,
it kept looking for migrants in distress, while waiting for the head of the
organization to fly to Tunisia with some journalists, hire a boat and reach the
Cap Anamur by sea. The aim was to prepare a campaign against the lethal
effects of EU border policies, to be launched upon disembarkation in Sicily.
Italian NGOs were contacted long before state authorities. On 22 June, the
head of the NGO declared that after disembarking the rescued migrants the
Cap Anamur would keep cruising in the Strait of Sicily in order to “observe
the situation of refugees”.40
Only on 29 June did the shipmaster ask for permission to land at Porto
Empedocle. The permission was first granted, then revoked, and the Italian
government sent navy ships and helicopters to prevent the German vessel
from entering territorial waters. On 11 July, the Cap Anamur was still
waiting at the border of Italian waters. After some passengers threatened
to throw themselves overboard, the master declared a state of emergency,
and Italian authorities escorted the Cap Anamur to Porto Empedocle.
Immediately upon landing, the ship was confiscated, while the shipmaster,
the first officer and the head of the NGO were all detained under the
charge of facilitating illegal immigration. After five years the court
acquitted them, recognizing that they had acted for humanitarian reasons
and not for profit, but the prosecution itself demonstrated the “ability of
the border regime to diffuse or even turn against itself the emancipatory
potential of attempts to expose the violence it produces”,41 and was
enough to send out the clear message that any humanitarian intervention
from non-state actors would be at one’s own risk.
With this regard, what happened to the German humanitarian ship was
not an exception if we consider other kinds of vessels as well: until 2013 state
authorities in the Mediterranean used to systematically discourage all sea-
farers – mainly fishing boats and cargoes – from accomplishing their duty to
rescue people in distress at sea, in the frame of what has been called the
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“governing of indifference”.42 However, in the case of the Cap Anamur the
attempt to turn a rescue intervention into a political act of contestation was
arguably crucial in determining that particular reaction of the Italian autho-
rities: for the first time, rescuing lives resulted in legal prosecution. The Cap
Anamur, much more than fishing boats and cargo vessels, posed a challenge
to the monopoly of the state in matters of life and death. When MOAS
started its first SAR mission in 2014, instead, the humanitarian issue of
rescuing lives in international waters had already been ultimately re-
appropriated by the state, both symbolically and practically, through the
operation Mare Nostrum, which turned the act of rescuing lives into a
spectacularized ritual of sovereign power.43
The military and humanitarian mission Mare Nostrum was launched by
the Italian government in October 2013 as a response to the Lampedusa
shipwreck that caused the death of 366 people. For the first time, a border
patrol mission had a specific mandate to rescue people, besides that of
protecting borders by reinforcing exclusionary policies and practices across
the securitized Mediterranean border. Mare Nostrum was the most signifi-
cant step in the process of institutional humanitarianization of the EU sea
border, in whose framework humanitarian arguments are deployed to sup-
port exclusionary policies and practices.44
Interestingly, one of the declared reasons why MSF and Sea-Watch
decided to step in was exactly the end of Mare Nostrum in late 2014. The
new operation Triton, which was launched by the EU border agency Frontex
simultaneously with the end of Mare Nostrum, had no specific SAR mandate,
fewer vessels and a much more limited operational area (30 nautical miles
south of Sicily). Indeed, Frontex had accused Mare Nostrum of attracting
more migrants (and causing more casualties) by patrolling next to Libyan
waters,45 although the surge in the number of people arriving to Italy by sea
had already begun before Mare Nostrum, in the summer of 2013. Restricting
the operational area and reducing the number of vessels and aircraft resulted
in more deaths46 and in the growing involvement of commercial ships in
SAR operations: the share of the persons rescued by commercial ships rose
from 25% in 2014 to 33% in the period from 1 January to 10 June 2015.47
Responding to SAR needs through the “temporary nationalisation of
commercial shipping”48 clearly contributed to the increase in border deaths,
since cargoes are not well equipped nor trained for SAR. After an estimated
700 people died during a SAR intervention carried out by a commercial
vessel in April 2015, two steps were taken by the EU: rescaling the Triton
mission, whose budget was tripled and whose operational area was extended
to 138 nautical miles south of Sicily, and launching the military operation
Eunavfor Med, tasked with disrupting smuggling networks in order to pre-
vent people from leaving Libya. Phase 1 of Eunavfor Med was launched on
22 June 2015 and was only aimed at collecting information. Phase 2a started
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on 7 October 2015. Its mandate is to arrest smugglers in international waters
and destroy their vessels, and it is still ongoing as of May 2017. In the
following phases 2b and 3, Eunavfor Med should further expand into
Libyan national waters and land territory.
Although Triton and Eunavfor Med have no official SAR mandate, they are
legally obliged, like all seafarers, to rescue people in distress, and they both spare
no efforts to stress their role of saviours of lives, thus contributing to the
discursive humanitarianization of the Mediterranean border. Together with the
Italian authorities, an Irish governmental humanitarian mission and the three
NGOs, Triton and Eunavfor Med almost entirely relieved commercial vessels
from SAR responsibilities: the contribution of merchant ships fell to slightly
more than 1% of the rescues carried out from 11 June to 31 December 2015.49
Overall, the increased number of both governmental and non-governmental
vessels close to Libyan waters resulted in a southward shift of SAR interventions.
In sum, the rise of non-governmental SAR actors in 2015 happened simul-
taneously with a radical restructuring of governmental policies and practices at
sea. In the post-Mare Nostrum framework, the act of rescuing people had been
clearly re-appropriated, both symbolically and practically, by state and supra-
state authorities. The position of the latter was now strong enough for them to
let other players play the game, because it was clearly still their game, and it was
them who were setting the rules. While the Cap Anamur represented a chal-
lenge to the then border regime, this was not the case for MOAS, MSF and Sea-
Watch, which could easily embed in the new, humanitarianized one. It was the
humanitarian governmentalization of international waters that made non-
governmental humanitarian intervention possible. In late 2015, governmental
and non-governmental, security and humanitarian actors, as well as security
and humanitarian concerns, converged to establish a space of governance in
which the depoliticized issue of how to better manage SAR interventions was
the main common ground. Even the confrontation between EU and Italian
authorities on where to patrol – how far from or how close to Libyan waters –
seemed to be overcome. Things changed only in the second half of 2016, when
governmental vessels stopped patrolling the area close to Libyan national
waters, as shown in the last section.
MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch
This section unpacks the work carried out by MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch
within the above context. It provides an overview of the relations between
SAR NGOs and the other actors involved in SAR, and it analyses the
differences between the three NGOs with regard to their political positions
as well as to their SAR practices (e.g. their availability to transfer the rescued
to the Italian territory, their cooperation with police authorities and the
private industry, the use they make of aerial vehicles).
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Political Positioning
MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch all refuse the idea that people should die for
trying to cross a border. Such refusal, in itself, doesn’t go beyond the
assumption that there is something wrong somewhere. As soon as we step
beyond this common refusal, we can see differences in the stance the
organizations take towards migration and border policies. MOAS has a
more diplomatic attitude, which reflects itself in the following statement:
“We must take politics out of search and rescue. We must put saving lives at
the top of the agenda”.50 In fact, the two founders clearly said that the
decision to create MOAS was taken “after seeing the lack of response to
hundreds of drownings in October 2013”,51 and expressed their concern, in
early 2015, about the end of Mare Nostrum and “the Frontex failure”,52
claiming that these two events would leave “2.5 million square kilometres
of sea […] unpatrolled”.53 Such statements express some criticism on gov-
ernmental border policies. However, MOAS privileges an attitude of pru-
dence, avoiding strong confrontations and political evaluations, following the
slogan “Save lives first. Sort out the politics later”.54 Legal and safe passages
to Europe are seen neither as a claim nor as an aim, but just as “our
dream”.55 The first brochure clearly explains MOAS’ apolitical approach:
MOAS is not a political action group, nor do we take a side in the various debates
about the influx of refugees to places of safety and opportunity. All MOAS does is
help rescue humans who would otherwise drown if help was not available.56
MSF, instead, clearly stresses the fact that humanitarian work can’t be kept
separated from the investigation and critique of the causes that make huma-
nitarian work necessary. A representative from MSF Amsterdam described
the basic difference between MSF and MOAS as follows: “They regard
themselves as service providers for the state. […] We are in tension with
the reality of the state, they are OK with it. They don’t go beyond saying that
no one should die at sea”. Because of its political implications, the decision to
engage in SAR activities in the Mediterranean was the object of in-depth
discussions in the different MSF sections.57
One of the aims of MSF is to pressure states to adequately increase
governmental SAR: “we will decide whether to continue or to stop depending
on how things will develop, on whether governmental authorities will deploy
enough vessels: we will stop if their presence is adequate”, a representative of
MSF Rome told me in September 2015. In March 2016, the same person
explained me the reasons why they had decided to extend their SAR mission:
the non-humanitarian mandate of both the Triton and the Eunavfor Med
operation; the fact that death at sea didn’t stop or decrease; the idea that “it is
useful to have someone playing the watchdog role in international waters,
trying to make sure that state authorities don’t do things they shouldn’t do”.
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Moreover, as another representative of MSF Rome told me in May 2016,
MSF aims to capitalize on the visibility provided by SAR operations in order,
“first, to spread a more humanized image of migration, one which is alter-
native to the stereotypical picture of an invasion caused by criminal actors,
and, second, to ask for safe passages”. Repeatedly, indeed, MSF has called not
only “to offer safe and legal ways for people to seek refuge and asylum in
Europe”,58 but also for “a radical re-think of migration policy”59 and the
creation of “legal migration pathways”.60 Thus, while not radically challen-
ging the distinction between forced and voluntary (‘economic’) migration,
MSF tries, at least, to reject the “binary representation of ‘deserving refugee’
versus ‘undeserving migrant’”,61 and to put migration and not only asylum
policies into question. In June 2016, in protest at the EU’s migration policy,
MSF also decided to reject any state funding from EU countries.62
Sea-Watch possibly has an even tougher attitude. “Our work is both
humanitarian and political. We want to put pressure on the politicians”,
two Sea-Watch members told me in June 2015. As a long-term solution, Sea-
Watch calls, like MSF, for legal avenues, not only for refugees but also for
other migrants. In the meantime, an “adequate civil search and rescue service
should be established”, while the measure to be taken immediately should be
“to actively involve in rescue activities the navy ships which are on the spot
but don’t do anything”.63 In July, the president of the association asked:
“Where have all the additional funds […] for the Frontex Triton mission
gone? They had been destined to sea rescue. Where are their vessels?”.64 By
denouncing the absence of governmental vessels from the SAR area, Sea-
Watch took up the role of the watchdog. On 13 October 2015, Sea-Watch
went a step further. As a response to the launch of phase 2 of Eunavfor Med,
it launched “phase 2 of an information offensive about the situation at the
maritime borders of Europe”65 with an event taking place in Berlin, in front
of the German Parliament House: a dinghy, one that was used by migrants,
was put on the Spree river, and MPs were invited to go aboard “in order to
have an impression of the conditions in which so many people are forced to
leave”.66 In February, finally, the president of Sea-Watch declared: “Even in
2016 we want to rescue as many people as possible, despite all obstacles
imposed on us by the EU with its persistent policy of closure”.67 In order to
do so, Sea-Watch has deployed a reconnaissance airplane, with which “we
will be able to observe the Med more closely and might be able to document
human rights abuse”.68
For MOAS, the Mediterranean is only the natural stage for rescue inter-
ventions, whereas MSF and Sea-Watch aim to turn it into a political stage
from which they can make their voice heard and on which they can play the
watchdog role. Indeed, the metaphor of the sea as a (political) stage recurred
in several of my interviews with both MSF and Sea-Watch members.
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Patrolling or Transferring?
Regardless of their political positions and the degree of criticism they express
towards government policies, MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch all cooperate with
the Italian authorities. Indeed, it is the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(MRCC) of Rome, run by the Italian Coast Guard, that has the responsibility of
coordinating SAR operations. This includes deciding which vessel should assist
the migrants and which one should bring them to the mainland, as well as
indicating in which port people should be disembarked (the latter decision being
taken by the Ministry of Interior). Interestingly, the operational area of MOAS,
MSF and Sea-Watch formally falls within what would theoretically be the Libyan
SAR region. However, Libya has never established its MRCC, and its Coast
Guard is neither equipped nor trained to carry out and coordinate SAR activities
effectively. Therefore, Italy must assume SAR responsibilities in that area.
In 2015, the three MSF vessels (including the MOAS-owned Phoenix) took
part in 120 separate rescue interventions. In almost all cases the NGO ships
had also to transfer the rescued people to the mainland. Furthermore, they
often took on board migrants who had been rescued by the Sea-Watch or by
other vessels (both military and commercial), while only very rarely were
people transhipped from the MSF/MOAS vessels to governmental ones.
Carrying people to the mainland means leaving the operational area for
several days. Time is needed for the travel69 as well as for disembarkation
procedures, during which police authorities come on board and carry out
first identification. Importantly, the speed difference between the MSF/
MOAS vessels and those of the Italian Navy and Coast Guard is quite big.
In 2015 and 2016, the by far fastest and largest among the NGO ships was
the Bourbon Argos (MSF), which can reach 14 knots and can carry even
more than 1000 people. Italian Navy ships (corvette, pattugliatori d’altura,
fregate), which have an even larger capacity, have a maximum speed of 24
to 27 knots.70 The Guardia Costiera has patrol boats that are as fast as 30
knots, while the maximum speed of larger coast guard vessels range from
15 to 32 knots.71 Arguably, sending faster vessels to transfer people
rescued by non-governmental ships would allow the latter to continue
their SAR activities in the operational area, whereas forcing them to
leave that area may increase the risk of casualties. While the Coast
Guard assures that they always consider the need not to reduce the overall
SAR capacity in the first place, when deciding which vessel should transfer
the rescued people, some doubts still arise, also in light of the fact that
navy ships are not obliged to use the Automatic Identification System
(AIS), a tracking system that makes vessels visible not only to Coast
Guard authorities but also to all other AIS-equipped vessels. In the end,
it is up to the discretion of the military authorities to inform the Coast
Guard about the position of their vessels.
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According to international law, states responsible for the coordination
of SAR must “ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by embark-
ing persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with
minimum further deviation from the ships’ intended voyage”.72 This
would provide a legal ground for NGO vessels to refuse being involved
in shuttle services, since their ‘intended voyage’ is clearly patrolling the
area next to Libyan waters. However, both MOAS and MSF prefer to
maintain good relations with the Italian authorities. Moreover, bringing
people to a port gives much more visibility in the media, which helps
increase both donations and the chances to make one’s voice heard (the
latter being an aim of MSF).
While MOAS and MSF wish the Italian authorities took the responsi-
bility of transfers, they accept to do what they are requested by MRCC
Rome. MSF only finds problematic to take on board people rescued by
Eunavfor Med vessels, whose primary aim is not to rescue people but to
prevent them from leaving North Africa: in this case, a civil rescue mission
is interrupted, while a military security one can carry on its activities.
Therefore, the Coast Guard met some resistance when it asked the
Bourbon Argos to take 115 people from a German Eunavfor Med ship
on 7 December 2015. In the end, however, MSF gave up and took the
migrants. “They [MRCC] understand and respect our principles. However,
saving lives must prevail over any other principle. Therefore we are
available, but only as a last resort”.
Contrary to MSF and MOAS vessels, the Sea-Watch could permanently
patrol the area close to Libyan waters in 2015. It was not only the slowest of
all non-governmental vessels, but it was also too small and ill-equipped to
take rescued people on board. Whenever a rescue was carried out by the Sea-
Watch, the MRCC had to ask another ship to transfer the rescued. In the
meantime, the Sea-Watch could host up to 400 people on its inflatable rafts.
A Sea-Watch member explained me: “At the very beginning we made clear
that we wouldn’t take anyone on board, nor would we carry anyone to land.
This was never questioned”.73 Things didn’t change when the Sea-Watch
replaced its old ship with a larger and faster one in 2016: “We are still very
small, very slow, and not equipped for providing care on board. This was our
choice”. A political choice aimed at confronting state authorities with their
responsibilities.
Images, Imaginaries, Police Cooperation and Private Industry
Transferring rescued migrants to an Italian port always implies some degree
of interaction with police authorities, which have the right to go on board the
ships at anchor and start identification procedures there. An event occurred
on 6 May 2015 shows that SAR NGOs have different positions regarding
12 P. CUTTITTA
cooperation with the police. That day, the Phoenix, managed by MOAS in
cooperation with MSF, brought 369 migrants to the Sicilian port of Pozzallo.
One of them was identified as the boat-driver and arrested based on images
provided by MOAS. The pictures were taken by one of the two drones that
MOAS has been renting since 2014 in order to increase search capacities.74
This resulted in frictions between MOAS and its partner MSF. A representa-
tive of MSF Amsterdam commented on it as follows: “MSF doesn’t feel we
should share sensitive imagery, unless we are legally bound. What MOAS did
was against our principles. To my knowledge, it didn’t happen again”.
Seemingly, MOAS did provide images to police authorities again in 2016,
after they separated from MSF.75 As regards the two vessels managed directly
by MSF, the Dignity I refused to provide images: “Italian police authorities
asked for our pictures, but we said we don’t give anything”. In fact, in case of
criminal investigation, SAR actors could not refuse to provide any material.
This is why the Bourbon Argos takes “no pictures and no videos, so we
prevent problems”. The Sea-Watch was never confronted with this issue,
because no one ever asked them anything, not even during the technical
stops in Italian territory.
The drone issue is relevant also with regard to the relations between the
private industry of border security and NGOs. In July 2015, for example, the
drone constructor turned to donor and granted MOAS free use of the drones
for two months. In a press release,76 as well as in an interview few weeks
later,77 MOAS praised the unmanned aerial vehicles of its sponsor. The use
of visual technologies thus poses a double challenge to the ideal of indepen-
dence of humanitarian action. Since the industry of security technologies is
increasingly active and influential in the field of border control,78 a reflection
on the potential impact of market dynamics on maritime SAR would be
needed. Moreover, the possibility to share sensitive images and information
with police authorities raises the issue of the independence of humanitarian
NGOs from the Italian and Libyan states. This concern is raised also by the
fact that two officials of the Libyan Navy were onboard MOAS’ ships, in
order to test the Schiebel drones for the Libyan government, in
September 2016.79
At the same time, visual production is also relevant for one of the political
aims of MSF and Sea-Watch: communicating a ‘correct’ image of migration.
On the one hand, the pictures of rescue interventions published on the
websites of MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch are necessary to document how
donated money is spent, and to attract new donors. On the other hand,
despite the attempts of MSF and Sea-Watch to opt for a more discreet
iconography as opposed to the systematic use of close-ups of children and
women made in MOAS’ website, all three NGOs end up perpetuating, to
some extent, the neo-colonial image of the ‘good’ Europeans helping the
suffering victims of the ‘bad’ smugglers. Thus, they contribute to portraying
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migrants as individuals in need of help in the first place, rather than as
subjects who, in trying to realize their projects, are contesting and defying the
political construct of the EU border regime.
Finally, because of their need for donations, and, in the case of MSF and Sea-
Watch, because of their intention to send out political messages against the
current border regime, all independent vessels always have journalists on board,
and their freedom to shoot and publish can hardly be limited. Indeed, humani-
tarian action is, by definition, asymmetrical, which is in itself at odds with the
idea of making it an instrument of political emancipation. Documenting SAR
work through visual production makes this contradiction apparent.
Rescue Operations or Forced Returns?
MOAS is authorized by the Libyan government to fly its drones over Libyan
waters, in order “to cover what is called the ‘dead zone’: the fatal few miles
from the Libyan shore”.80 This arguably means that, if a drone spots a
migrant boat in Libyan waters, MOAS will have to alert the Libyan autho-
rities, either directly or through the Italian MRCC. Indeed, all migrant vessels
are considered, by definition, to be in distress, which is the condition that
makes a rescue intervention obligatory by law. In fact, international law
doesn’t provide a clear and univocal interpretation for the term ‘distress’,
but the Italian MRCC, as well as NGOs working under its coordination,
decided to interpret it extensively to reduce the risk of casualties. While the
Italian MRCC has taken over responsibilities in what is supposed to be the
Libyan SAR region in international waters, it must contact its Libyan coun-
terpart, for obvious reasons of sovereignty, if it is aware of a migrant vessel
that is still in Libyan national waters. This sometimes results in the Libyan
authorities to intercept the boat and drive the passengers back to a Libyan
port. Thus, a true humanitarian concern (considering all migrant vessels to
be in distress), in combination with territorial sovereignty constraints, can
end up serving the interests of border control, turning a SAR operation into a
forced return. The choice of MOAS to fly their drones over Libyan waters
raises concerns not only regarding possible forced returns, but also regarding
potential police cooperation (exchange of information) with Libyan autho-
rities and with Eunavfor Med, whose task is to disrupt smuggling gangs in
Libya and to prevent departures.81
MSF activities in the southern Tunisian town of Zarzis may produce opposite
effects instead. In recent years, many migrants who had left from the Libyan
port of Zuwara, close to the Tunisian border, were found in distress by Tunisian
fishermen. The fishermen alerted the Tunisian Coast Guard, and the rescued
were brought to Tunisia, thus missing the chance to get to Europe only because
they were spotted by the ‘wrong’ vessels. In 2015 MSF Brussels organized
training in SAR and dead body management for Zarzis’ fishermen’s
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association.82 Members of the latter told me they informally agreed with MSF
that they would use the international radio channel dedicated to distress calls
should they spot migrants in international waters. SAR would then be coordi-
nated by the Italian MRCC, and this would prevent side effects such as those
that MOAS’ drones are instead likely to engender.
Finally, Sea-Watch vocally denounced forced returns by the Libyan Coast
Guard, as shown in the next section.
Mutual Understanding in the Enlarged SAR System
All NGOs are constantly in touch with MRCC Rome, which coordinates SAR
activities.
However, NGOs also established relations with those state and supra-state
authorities whose mandate is not SAR. In March 2016 MSF organised a SAR
workshop in Rome, to which all governmental and non-governmental actors
were invited. The aim of the meeting was enhancing mutual understanding.
Preventing conflicts and enhancing mutual understanding was also the
aim of previous bilateral meetings between MSF and other actors such as
Eunavfor Med. A representative of MSF Rome explained to me:
This is what we always do when we go to conflict zones: we consult the actors in
the field, we explain our positions and principles, we collect information about
their plans, about what resources they are deploying. In short, we carry out a
standard context analysis.
The MSF workshop followed one organized by the International Institute of
Humanitarian Law (IIHL) a week before, bringing together state authorities,
the shipping industry, international organizations, regional and intergovern-
mental bodies, NGOs and academics.83 It was there that Sea-Watch and
Eunavfor Med first met. Since then, diplomatic relations between the NGO
and the EU naval mission developed swiftly. “Now we have a fruitful
exchange of SAR operational information with Eunavfor Med, as well as
with Frontex”, a Sea-Watch representative told me in June 2016. Then my
interviewee added:
Informally, we have to cooperate. Recently, Eunavfor Med called us from the scene
of a shipwreck. There were hundreds of dead bodies on the sea surface, so they
asked us for help to recover them. In the end, we said yes: it’s difficult to refuse
cooperation for political reasons in a matter of life and death.
Sea-Watch, in turn, asked Eunavfor Med for protection against possible
attacks. In April 2016, while the Sea-Watch was carrying out a SAR opera-
tion, it was boarded by Libyan officials, who shot in the air and claimed the
NGO vessel was not allowed to be there.
GEOPOLITICS 15
After this incident we asked Eunavfor Med to protect us in case of need. While
other NGOs, most notably MSF, didn’t agree with our position, we decided to be
realistic: erecting walls doesn’t make sense.
Although this issue was never raised again in the relations between Sea-
Watch and Eunavfor Med, the request for protection shows that even Sea-
Watch, despite its polemical tones against Eunavfor Med, is nurturing the
ambiguous relationship that humanitarian organizations “have cultivated
with the armies, whose protection these organizations expect […], even as
they demand their autonomy be maintained”.84
Interestingly, the request was formulated during the second meeting on
Shared Awareness and De-confliction in the Mediterranean (SHADE MED),
organized by Eunavfor Med in Rome in May 2016. The SHADE MED
meetings, held twice a year since November 2015, are intended as a common
framework “to share experience and best practices”85 for the different actors
involved in maritime operations in the Central Mediterranean. These include
governments and armed forces of the coastal states of the Mediterranean, interna-
tional institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union and non-
governmental entities involved in rescue operations at sea.86
Such fora open up a hybrid space of exchange and negotiation, whose aim is
not debating on migration and border policies but rather the enhancement of
mutual understanding, the prevention of conflicts and the exchange of good
SAR practices between actors that have different tasks and are inspired by
different principles. Indeed, while all participants agree that loss of life must
be prevented, some of them are mandated to implement those very policies
that others squarely condemn. Workshops and meetings make the “new
coalitions” produced by humanitarianized border regimes under the banner
of the converging “rationalities of humanitarianism, human rights and
security”87 visible.
However, mutual understanding means not only addressing the depoliti-
cized issue of how to better coordinate SAR efforts, but also presenting one’s
own ideas and principles, which can be openly political. Although political
discussions take place more at the bilateral than at the multilateral level,
meetings such as SHADE MED and the IIHL and MSF workshops are not
only technical but also diplomatic fora that MSF and Sea-Watch consider as
useful to reach their political aims, and therefore as political in themselves.
Reconfiguring the Central Mediterranean: The Anti-NGO Offensive
The attack against the Sea-Watch 2 in April 2016 was only the first of a series
of acts of hostility from the Libyan authorities against SAR NGOs in inter-
national waters. On 17 August, the MSF’s Bourbon Argos was approached by
Libyan Coast Guard officials who fired several bullets, and then boarded and
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searched the vessel.88 On 9 September, two volunteers and a speedboat of
another NGO were seized by Libyan authorities and brought to Tripoli.89
Sea-Watch experienced two further incidents in the following months. In
October 2016, Libyan officials boarded a dinghy that was being rescued by
the Sea-Watch 2, causing its deflation and the drowning of dozens of
people.90 In May 2017, the Libyan Coast Guard interrupted a rescue opera-
tion by Sea-Watch to return hundreds of people to Libya (this time under the
coordination of the Italian MRCC, which informed the NGO vessel that the
Libyan boat would assume ‘on-scene command’ of the SAR operation).91 The
political response of Sea-Watch to the latter event was to invite the
International Criminal Court to extend its envisaged investigation into
“migrant-related crimes in Libya”92 to forced returns.93
These incidents in international waters can only be understood against the
background of evolving relations between Italian, EU and Libyan authorities
since the establishment of a government of national accord (GNA)94 in Tripoli
in early 2016. Once it became clear that the conditions for Eunavfor Med to
enter Libyan territory would not be met soon, if at all, the prime concern
became reinforcing the capacities of Libyan authorities, in order for them to
stop migrants before they are rescued by other vessels and consequently
brought to Italy. The increase in the number of people ‘rescued’ at sea by the
Libyan authorities95 after the establishment of the GNA showed the willing-
ness of the latter to cooperate, in exchange for political support. People were
mostly intercepted in Libyan waters, but some returns were carried out from
international waters. In order to leave more room for the intervention of
Libyan patrol boats, Frontex and Eunavfor Med vessels gradually retracted
from the southern part of their operational areas in the summer of 2016. As a
result, the share of people rescued by governmental vessels dropped from
80.1% in the period January–May to 60.9% in the period June–December.96
Furthermore, the EU started training the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in
October 2016, while Italy, after signing an agreement with the GNA in
February 2017, gave Libyan authorities four patrol boats between April and
May, and promised to deliver further six vessels by June.
In this context, the presence of independent rescue vessels next to Libyan
waters was an obstacle for Libyan authorities, which therefore tried to
discourage the NGO crews by repeatedly attacking them. Soon, SAR NGOs
were attacked by European authorities as well. Allegations made by Frontex97
were followed by a series of public statements made by the public prosecutor
of Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro, in early 2017. Zuccaro declared that NGOs
operating next to Libyan waters act as a pull factor and are responsible for
the use of increasingly unseaworthy vessels by smugglers. He also denounced
the lack of cooperation of NGOs with police authorities, and said some of
them might not only be colluded with (and even directly financed by)
smugglers, but also have hidden political aims such as destabilizing the
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Italian economy through the mass influx of migrants.98 Furthermore, Italian
media and political actors accused NGOs to aim at “the ethnic replacement
of peoples by other peoples”,99 and their vessels to patrol too close to Libyan
waters and even in Libyan waters,100 thus creating corridors for smugglers.
They asked for suspected NGOs to be brought to court, as well as for
restrictive measures to be imposed on all NGO vessels. As of mid-May
2017, preliminary investigations had been reportedly opened up by the
Trapani court (against some crew members of an MSF vessel),101 as well as
by the Palermo court.102 Moreover, after a series of hearings of both govern-
mental and non-governmental actors, a parliamentary committee adopted a
document inviting SAR NGOs to register their crews with Italian authorities,
to disclose their lists of donors, to cooperate with police authorities, and not
to create de facto humanitarian corridors.103 The committee chair suggested
authorities could deny the permission to dock in Italian ports for NGO
vessels not complying with these requests.104
The ongoing reconfiguration of the Central Mediterranean can be sum-
marized in two main points. First, Italian and European authorities are
strengthening the Libyan Coast Guard, with the main aim being for Libya
to establish an effective MRCC and coordinate and carry out SAR in the
portion of international waters constituting its SAR region. This would
significantly increase the number of migrants forcibly returned and thus
kept away from Europe. Second, the media, political and judicial campaign
against SAR NGOs seems to aim at undermining their popular support. This
would both reduce donations (thus forcing NGOs to abandon the field) and
make the replacement of NGO rescue ships by Libyan patrol boats morally
acceptable.
While the evolution in the relations between Italy/EU and Libya can’t be
seen as a response to independent SAR, it seems to attest to the inception of a
new phase in the cyclic alternation between humanitarian and security logics
in dominating the construction and representation of the EU sea border.105
Indeed, the two narratives of the ‘tough’ and the ‘humane’ border106 always
coexist,107 but their balance is always fluctuating, if in the fundamentally
unchanged context of a restrictive migration and border regime.
While this new phase is not a direct reaction to non-governmental SAR,
the work of SAR NGOs seems to be at odds with the objectives to restore a
more restrictive, and yet depoliticized and unquestioned, border regime in
the Central Mediterranean.
On the one hand, the media, political and judicial offensive against SAR
NGOs was directed against all SAR NGOs, also including MOAS, and not
only against the politically engaged. It was non-governmental SAR per se that
represented an obstacle for the envisaged externalization of borderwork to
Libyan authorities. While this suggests that “humanitarianism is an inher-
ently political concept”,108 insofar as humanitarian borderwork can assume
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political relevance even if carried out without the intention to be political,
this is not enough for the NGO action to be considered as ‘political’ based on
the definition provided in the first section.
However, the offensive may be explained also by the most explicitly political
attitudes of some of the organizations involved, most notably the refusal of MSF
and Sea-Watch to voluntarily cooperate with police authorities, and their
intention to play the watchdog role on the high seas. Should Libya establish
its MRCC and effectively assume control of its SAR region, SAR NGOs would
be confronted with the highly political challenge of how to react to the
externalization of SAR, as the incident of 10 May 2017 clearly suggests.
Finally, the media, political and judicial campaign was accompanied by
initiatives from the civil society. In November 2016, Gefira, a political
foundation based in the Netherlands, which sees Europe “as a sanctuary of
our indigenous European peoples”,109 accused SAR NGOs of acting in
coordination with smugglers.110 Few months later, the international move-
ment Generation Identity launched the project ‘Defend Europe’, a mission
“to rescue Europe by stopping illegal immigration”.111 The activists, con-
cerned about the loss of European identity, set up an anti-NGO vessel, whose
first demonstrative action was trying to hinder an MSF vessel from leaving
the Catania harbour for the SAR operational area.112 This suggests that one
of the repoliticizing effects of non-governmental SAR was another non-
governmental intervention, advocating not for more open but for more
restrictive border policies.
Conclusion
This article has shed some light on non-governmental humanitarian border-
work in the international waters of the Central Mediterranean, and, more
specifically, on the role of SAR NGOs in the process of depoliticization/
repoliticization of the EU sea border regime.
First, the article has shown that only the symbolic and practical re-
appropriation by state and supra-state authorities of the act of rescuing
people (through Mare Nostrum and the following restructuring of govern-
mental policies and practices at an increasingly humanitarianized sea border)
allowed for NGOs to engage in SAR activities in international waters.
Then, the article has shown that MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch react
differently to the contradictions that are typical of humanitarian non-state
action and that reappear in the governmentalized space of international
waters in the Central Mediterranean. Some of these contradictions are
summarized by the following words from a representative of MSF
Amsterdam: “We don’t want to replace the states. Are we relieving them
from their responsibilities? Are we allowing them to use their resources for
purposes which are different from SAR?”.
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Arguably, by cooperating with Frontex and Eunavfor Med, as well as by
transferring people and handing them over to the Italian police authorities,
NGOs are not only relieving governmental actors from their responsibilities.
They are also providing operational support and humanitarian non-state
legitimation to the border regime they declare to contest. Like those aid
workers who “become logisticians in the war efforts of warlords”,113 they
thus become part of a hybrid border management system that results in
limiting the freedom of asylum seekers in Europe through the Dublin
regulation, in either forcibly returning or illegalizing those who are denied
protection, in arresting and prosecuting purported smugglers, as well as in
enhancing cooperation with countries of departure with the aim to prevent
people from reaching Europe. In such context, the humanitarianized border-
space that non-governmental SAR actors are contributing to shape and
manage in the high seas of the Central Mediterranean, under the coordina-
tion and in cooperation with governmental authorities, seems to be an
increasingly depoliticized one.
However, some NGOs believe that they can contribute to its repoliticiza-
tion. With this regard, the article has shown different degrees of political
positioning, ranging from silence to open and vocal criticism towards current
migration and border policies. While MOAS keeps a neutral political profile,
MSF and Sea-Watch declare their aim to pressure and influence authorities
with a view to change the policies they hold responsible for border deaths.
More broadly, they regard their SAR activities as part of a political, not only
humanitarian commitment. The question is whether their political senti-
ments are able to produce political practices, and with what results.
Other authors, indeed, have pointed out the essential role that solidarity114
and connectivity115 can play for humanitarian work to turn political. Stierl116
argues that this is also the case for the Mediterranean SAR context. This article
suggests that, while the subjective perspective of humanitarian actors is surely
crucial to develop practices that aim to be political, it is the practice and its
outcomes, in the end, that make the difference, and practices, in the interna-
tional waters of the Central Mediterranean, are highly conditioned by the
convergence of delocalized state sovereignty and humanitarian reason in a
field of tension that leaves hardly any room for manoeuvre. Indeed, state
authorities resort to the same humanitarian principles put forward by NGOs,
which limits the autonomy, and thus the political agency, of the latter. The
shared humanitarian reason makes it difficult, if not impossible, for non-state
actors to take a more challenging stance, and “blurs the boundary between
what is governmental and what is non-governmental”,117 as shown by the
impossibility for MSF and Sea-Watch to refuse operational cooperation with
Eunavfor Med, with Sea-Watch even asking the EU military mission for
protection. Moreover, as regards the policy changes requested by MSF and
Sea-Watch, the provisional outcome of the NGOs’ political commitment looks
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like a failure: authorities have intensified their efforts aimed at preventing
people from leaving, and no humanitarian corridors have been created, except
for those opened up by Italy, which will provide safe passage to just 1,500
people in two years.118 Even the increase in governmental SAR capacities
resulting from the upgrade of Triton and the launch of Eunavfor Med in the
summer of 2015 can hardly be seen as a success. First, because it can’t be
demonstrated that it was a consequence of political pressure from MSF and
Sea-Watch, while it is highly plausible that it was an autonomous policy
adjustment; second, because the missions only (and only partially) filled a
humanitarian gap while reinforcing the border policies denounced by the
NGOs; third, because the 2015 expansion of their geographical scope was
followed by its sudden restriction a year later.
However, some practices – despite their outcomes being hardly measurable
and possibly very limited – are clearly political acts. The choice of Sea-Watch not
to transfer people to the mainland, and thus to impose on theMRCC the burden
to identify other means of transport, is an act of contestation against border
policies which not only prioritize the deterrence and containment of mobility
over saving lives and respecting the human rights and dignity of migrants, but
also often end up shifting the burden of SAR to non-state actors (commercial
ships andNGOs), thus enabling governmental authorities to focus evenmore on
deterrence and containment. Sea-Watch boycotts this logic by trying to divert
governmental efforts from border enforcing to SAR and transfers.
Furthermore, the reconnaissance airplane could help Sea-Watch to play
the watchdog role against possible unlawful actions by governmental
actors in international waters (which is also an aim of MSF). Arguably,
the fact that no abuses from Italian and EU authorities were reported so
far could well be the effect of deterring watchdog practices. The attacks on
SAR NGOs suggest that watchdogs are unwelcome guests in the area next
to Libyan waters, and the reaction of Sea-Watch to the forced return of
10 May 2017 explains why.
A further example of solidarity turning to practice is the interaction between
MSF and the fishermen association in Zarzis, insofar as it aims at preventing
accidental returns to North Africa while providing safe passages to Europe.
MSF and Sea-Watch are also taking advantage of the visibility provided by
SAR to campaign against current EU border policies and practices, as well as to
promote an alternative image of migration. However, it is impossible to deter-
mine how large an audience they reach and how effective their messages are in
influencing it.
In sum, SAR NGOs fluctuate between depoliticization and repoliticization;
their political-humanitarian intervention does not only increase SAR capa-
cities of governmental actors but is also able, to some extent, to condition
and influence, to control and denounce the activities of the latter in inter-
national waters.
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Importantly, whatever the next developments in the reconfiguration of the
Central Mediterranean border regime, the space of international waters
remains free for navigation under international law, and the legal obligation
to rescue people in distress maintains the highest rank in the hierarchy of
norms of the international legal order. As long as financial means are
provided, SAR NGOs will be free to continue their missions, but they will
be confronted with a serious challenge, should the Libyan authorities take
over responsibility for SAR operations in their own SAR region. Therefore,
contesting or even contrasting the externalization of SAR to Libya (by
keeping patrolling the area close to Libyan waters and refusing to bring the
rescued people to Libya) seems to be the political task for SAR NGOs in the
changing context of the Central Mediterranean, while investigating the rela-
tionship between depoliticization/repoliticization processes and different spa-
tialities and legal regimes would be an interesting avenue for further research.
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